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Administrative law is full of questions about deference. Recently,
quite a bit of attention has been focused on Auer deference, which is the
deference afforded to agency interpretations of their own regulations.' First
announced in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. ,2 the modem under-
standing of the doctrine is that an agency's interpretations of its own regula-
tions receive deference unless "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation."' This deference attaches to agency interpretations without
much regard to the notice or process that accompanies the interpretation.4
Indeed, Auer itself afforded deference to an interpretation that was put forth
for the first time in an amicus brief in litigation.'
Beginning in the mid-1990s, Auer deference has generated quite a bit
of scholarly debate. Some argued that Auer deference violates the separa-
tion of powers between legislative, judicial, and executive functions.6 Oth-
ers suggested that deferential interpretation of agency-created regulations
circumvents traditional checks on administrative lawmaking.' Within the
last five years, several justices on the Supreme Court have expressed re-
newed interest in this issue and signaled an openness to reconsider Auer
deference.'
Surprisingly, the debate over Auer deference has taken little notice of
the peculiar circumstances surrounding Seminole Rock and its subsequent
evolution into today's Auer doctrine. In a separate work, the authors con-
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law.
Professor of Law, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law.
See Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000) (explaining Auer deference).
2 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
3 Id. at 414.
4 See Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REv. 355, 366 (2012) (identifring
inadequacies in interpretive methods of agency regulations).
5 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997).
6 John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of
Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 612, 618 (1996).
7 Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don't Get It, 10
ADMIN L.J. 1, 12 (1996).
8 See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1338 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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ducted an in-depth examination of the evolution of Seminole Rock from a
restrained and unremarkable doctrine in the 1940s to a full-blown and wide-
ly applied "axiom ofjudicial review" in the 1970s.' During this evolution, it
appears that Seminole Rock shifted from its constrained origins as a result
of the growth of the administrative state. This transformation, however,
took place largely without explanation or acknowledgement from courts or
commentators.
This Article informs the current debate over Auer deference by explor-
ing the roots of the Seminole Rock decision and its subsequent reinterpreta-
tion through a creative approach. To do so, this Article offers a series of
hypothetical opinions applying the various historical interpretations of Sem-
inole Rock to a single set of facts. Part I places Seminole Rock in the con-
stellation of deference doctrines in administrative law so that one can easily
understand what the doctrine is and when it applies. Part II examines the
transformation of Seminole Rock through a series of hypothetical D.C. Cir-
cuit opinions based on the facts of Decker v. Northwest Environmental De-
fense Center ("NEDC").o These opinions illustrate how courts have strug-
gled to apply this expansive and untethered doctrine in the face of a grow-
ing administrative state. Part III offers observations from this exercise and
urges reconsideration of Auer deference to reconcile the current doctrine
with Seminole Rock's historical roots.
I. THE MANY SHADES OF DEFERENCE
As any law student can attest, one of the trickiest questions to tackle is
the proper deference to afford agency actions. Rather than reviewing agen-
cy actions de novo, courts often defer to agencies by engaging in only a
limited review of the agency's actions." In general, application of deference
standards means that "a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency."2
9 Sanne H. Knudsen & Amy J. Wildermuth, Unearthing the Lost History of Seminole Rock, 65
EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 1, 5) (quoting Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Lloyd Wood
Constr. Co., 446 F.2d 261, 265 (5th Cir. 1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=2555718.
t0 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013).
11 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
("We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to admin-
istrative interpretations 'has been consistently followed by this Court whenever decision as to the mean-
ing or reach of a statute has involved reconciling conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the
force of the statutory policy in the given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge
respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations."' (footnote omitted) (quoting United States v.
Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1961))).
12 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-43 (1983).
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There are five general deference doctrines in administrative law. Two
doctrines derive directly from the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")
itself: (1) the arbitrary and capricious standard of § 706(2)(A);" and (2) the
substantial evidence doctrine found in § 706(2)(E).1 4 Both of these doctrines
describe how courts must review the substantive work processes and out-
comes of administrative agency proceedings. Each applies, however, in
different circumstances.
Arbitrary and capricious review is the general backstop provision of
review that applies to all agency actions unless a more specific provision
applies." As a result, it applies to informal proceedings, like informal rule-
making.'" The scope of judicial review is described as "narrow." It only
requires a court to find that an "agency [has] examine[d] the relevant data
and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 'ration-
al connection between the facts found and the choice made.'""8
Similarly, the substantial evidence standard, which applies to formal
agency proceedings,9 is also highly deferential.20 Under the substantial evi-
dence standard, a court must uphold the agency's action if the record has
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support" the agency's conclusion.2 1 In other words, the agency's action
must be reasonable.22
Most courts and commentators conclude that there is no difference be-
tween the substantial evidence and arbitrary and capricious standards.23
Moreover, both of these standards are considered more deferential than the
"clearly erroneous standard of review" employed by appellate courts when
reviewing the factual findings of trial courts.24
13 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
14 Id. § 706(2)(E). See also Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative
Law, Ill COLUM. L. REV. 1722, 1733 n.41 (2011) (explaining the two doctrines).
15 WIlLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE: PROBLEMS AND
CASES 162-63 (5th ed. 2014).
16 Id. at 162.
17 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
18 Id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). Similar
to Justice Rehnquist's suggestion in his separate opinion in State Farm, Professor Kathryn Watts has
argued that courts should recognize the role of presidential or congressional policy preferences under the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in
Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 12-13 (2009).
19 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E); see also Meazell, supra note 14, at 1733 n.41 (noting that the substantial
evidence standard is used in formal proceedings that utilize the procedures articulated in §§ 556 and 557
of the APA).
20 FUNK ET AL., supra note 15, at 279.
21 Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
22 FUNK ET AL., supra note 15, at 163.
23 Id. at 163-64.
24 Id at 279-80 (citing Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999)).
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Outside of the APA, three additional deference standards focus on how
courts should review agency interpretations of the statutes that they admin-
ister and the regulations that they promulgate. Although all three have roots
in the 1940s,25 these standards are known by the cases in which they were
most recently articulated.
The first is the well-known Chevron doctrine from Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.26 Until the Christensen v.
Harris County" decision discussed below, in order to understand statutory
interpretation in the administrative context, one only needed to know the
two-step process. First, has "Congress [] directly spoken to the precise
question at issue"? 28 To answer this question, a court used the "traditional
tools of statutory construction."29 If Congress has spoken directly, the court
"must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."30 If,
instead, "the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific is-
sue,"3' the court must determine whether the agency's interpretation is
"permissible"32 or a "reasonable interpretation."3 If so, the court must defer
to the agency's interpretation, even if the court would have reached a dif-
ferent interpretation in the first instance.34 If the agency's interpretation is
unreasonable, the court does not defer.35
Featured as the watershed statutory interpretation case in administra-
tive law casebooks,6 Chevron marked an innovation by clearly articulating
a two-step analytical process. But on closer examination, Chevron has
much deeper roots than its 1984 decision date suggests.7 Several earlier
25 Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945) (Auer deference); NLRB v. Hearst
Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. Ill (1944) (Chevron deference); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
26 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
27 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
28 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
29 Id. at 843 n.9.
30 Id. at 843.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id at 844.
34 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.1 1.
35 Id. at 843 n.9.
36 See WILLIAM F. FUNK & RICHARD H. SEAMON, EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS:
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 275 (4th ed. 2012) (noting that Chevron "has become the most cited (and per-
haps debated) administrative law decision of all time").
3 Cf Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron Mis-
conceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REv. 673, 682 (2007) (arguing
that Chevron is the tipping point for a major change in review of agency action: "[C]ourts treated a
broader range of issues on review in the pre-Chevron world--even some that in a sense are administra-
tive interpretations of statutes as administrative implementation-and courts subjected them to the
standard of the APA that ensures rational administrative decision-making. Courts did not cabin those
typical administrative actions into a special realm of so-called questions of law or statutory construc-
tion."); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 247 (2006) ("In 1984, it was not
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cases, cited in Chevron," approved of deference to reasonable agency inter-
pretations of the statute the agency administered.39 In particular, the 1944
case of NLRB v. Hearst40 has many similarities to Chevron, including its
core idea that a court's review is "limited" when an agency is interpreting a
term that is within its expertise in administering the statute.4 '
The second doctrine, which was recently revived in a series of deci-
sions in the early 2000s,42 is the Skidmore doctrine from the 1944 case of
Skidmore v. Swift & Co." The Skidmore doctrine provides for deference on
a sliding scale from "great respect at one end . .. to near indifference at the
other."" Courts determine the appropriate amount of deference on this scale
based on a number of factors.45 These factors include "the thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.""
What is tricky is that both Chevron and Skidmore apply when an agen-
cy interprets its organic statute." That is, they apply to agencies' statutory
interpretations. But both cannot apply at the same time. So when does each
apply?
After some initial confusion,48 the Supreme Court clarified in Chris-
tensen v. Harris County49 that Chevron applies to agency interpretations of
entirely clear whether Chevron was a synthesis of existing law, as the Courtappeared to believe at the
time, or instead a genuine revolution, signaling a new era in the relationship between courts and regula-
tory agencies." (footnote omitted)).
38 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.11, 844 n.14.
39 See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) ("When faced with a problem of statutory
construction, this Court shows great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or
agency charged with its administration.").
40 322 U.S. 111 (1944). See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implica-
tions of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 1093, 1120 (1987). Interestingly, the justice who authored Chevron, Justice Stevens, clerked for
Justice Rutledge, the author of Hearst.
41 Hearst, 322 U.S. at 130-31.
42 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529
U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
43 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
44 Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (citation omitted).
4S Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
46 id
47 See Bradley George Hubbard, Comment, Deference to Agency Statutory Interpretations First
Advanced in Litigation? The Chevron Two-Step and the Skidmore Shuffle, 80 U. Cm. L. REv. 447, 452-
53 (2013).
48 See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (articulating the factors for applying Chevron
as "the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the
question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the careful consider-
ation the Agency has given the question over a long period of time").
49 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
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their organic statutes when that interpretation has the force of law."o This
test focuses on whether the agency has engaged in an APA process such as
informal rulemaking or formal procedures under §§ 556 and 557, as well as
whether the result of the process is legally binding." If, instead, the agen-
cy's statutory interpretation arises from something other than rulemaking or
a decision resulting from a formal process, the interpretation receives Skid-
more deference.52
Commentators and courts typically describe Chevron as a stronger
form of deference than the standard in Skidmore." Despite this characteri-
zation, studies have found that courts defer to agencies' interpretations at
roughly identical rates, regardless of whether Chevron or Skidmore defer-
ence applies.S4
The third and final interpretive deference doctrine, and the focus of
this Article, is what is now known as Auer deference from Auer v. Rob-
bins." That case relied on the language of the 1945 decision of Bowles v.
Seminole Rock & Sand Co."6 Seminole Rock announced the deference owed
to agency interpretations of their own regulations: "[T]he ultimate criterion
is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.""
Like Chevron deference, Auer deference is viewed as strong defer-
ence, and courts uphold agency interpretations under Auer at a higher rate
than either Chevron or Skidmore deference." Unlike Chevron deference,
Auer applies to a wide range of regulatory interpretations, including inter-
pretations that appear for the first time in a brief in litigation." Not limited
50 Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 173 (2007).
51 Id. (describing the factors for applying Chevron as "[w]here an agency rule sets forth important
individual rights and duties, where the agency focuses fully and directly upon the issue, where the
agency uses full notice-and-comment procedures to promulgate a rule, [and] where the resulting rule
falls within the statutory grant of authority").
52 These decisions may include "opinion letters[,] ... policy statements, agency manuals, and
enforcement guidelines . . . ." Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587.
53 FUNK ETAL., supra note 15, at 386.
54 This rate of deference, for both cases applying Chevron and Skidmore, is somewhere between
60 and 70 percent. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions
Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 83-85 (2011).
55 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
56 Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
57 Id.
58 See Pierce, supra note 54, at 84 (citing a 91 percent affirmance rate of agencies in Auer cases at
the Supreme Court); Richard J. Pierce, Jr. & Joshua Weiss, An Empirical Study of Judicial Review of
Agency Interpretations ofAgency Rules, 63 ADMIN. L. REv. 515, 519-20 (2011) (finding a 76 percent
affirmance rate under Auer in district and circuit court cases).
59 Auer, 519 U.S. at 462. Such was the case in Auer itself.
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to a particular regulation, Auer deference has even been applied to an entire
regulatory scheme."o
After surveying these deference doctrines, most students (and many
practitioners) are left more than a little confused. Many have proposed to
simplify this complex scheme. For example, Professor David Zaring has
argued that because courts uphold the agency's position in roughly 70 per-
cent of cases regardless of the type of deference that applies, courts should
replace the current doctrines with a uniform rule of reasonableness.6'
Others have questioned whether deference to agency interpretations of
law is appropriate at all.62 After all, as Chief Justice John Marshall an-
nounced in Marbury v. Madison," "It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is."' Many students, fresh
from their first course in constitutional law, have fairly wondered how
courts can justify doctrines like Chevron in which Article III courts defer to
an executive agency's interpretation of law.
The problem is even more acute with respect to Auer deference. Al-
most twenty years ago, Professor John Manning warned that Auer defer-
ence raises a separation of powers problem: "Seminole Rock leaves an
agency free both to write a law and then to 'say what the law is' through its
authoritative interpretation of its own regulations."" Because "administra-
tive agencies exercis[e] delegated lawmaking authority, as well as per-
form[] executive and adjudicative functions," Manning argued that "it is
crucial to have some meaningful external check upon the power of the
agency to determine the meaning of the laws that it writes."" Manning
therefore urged the Supreme Court to "replace Seminole Rock with a stand-
60 Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 284 (2009) ("The Memo-
randum presents a reasonable interpretation of the regulatory regime. We defer to the interpretation
because it is not 'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation[s]."' (alteration in original) (quot-
ing Auer, 519 U.S. at 461)).
61 David Zaring, Rule by Reasonableness, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 525, 526 (2011); see also Pierce,
supra note 54, at 98 (concluding that scholars hould stop worrying about each individual deference
doctrine and "focus instead on the three common elements of the doctrines: consistency with applicable
statutes, consistency with available evidence, and quality of agency reasoning").
62 See, e.g., Anthony, supra note 7, at 11-12; Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experi-
ment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CoNN. L. REV. 779,
782 (2010); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron's Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 562 (2009); Manning, supra
note 6, at 613-14 & nn.9-10. On the current Court, Justice Scalia has been the most skeptical in defer-
ence cases. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (question-
ing the Court's readoption of Skidmore deference in lieu of applying Chevron deference); see also
Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at 295 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (criticizing
the articulation of deference in that case for being too complicated).
63 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
64 Id. at 177.
65 Manning, supra note 6, at 618.
66 Id. at 682.
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ard that imposes an independent judicial check on the agency's determina-
tion of regulatory meaning.""
Professor Robert Anthony likewise argued that Seminole Rock defer-
ence should be abandoned in favor of respectful consideration of the agen-
cy's position:
Agencies will realize that they can issue such documents--creating tangible meaning where
the regulations did not-with a high degree of confidence that their interpretations, issued
without notice and comment, will be upheld because they are not inconsistent with the regu-
lation. This prospect generates incentives to be vague in framing regulations, with the plan of
issuing "interpretations" to create the intended new law without observance of notice and
comment procedures.
6 8
The Supreme Court has repeatedly voiced skepticism of Auer defer-
ence,69 especially in the last few terms." In Decker v. NEDC, Chief Justice
John Roberts announced, "The bar is now aware that there is some interest
in reconsidering [Seminole Rock and Auer]."` Roberts's statement has led
Court-watchers to conclude that the Supreme Court is likely to reexamine
Auer deference when it finds "a case in which the issue is properly raised
and argued."72
Much of the scholarly commentary on Auer expresses similar concerns
about the current application of the doctrine in Decker. This is perhaps best
captured by this statement from an amicus brief from law professors in the
Decker litigation:
[Auer] deference would encourage the agency to adopt regulations that amount to little more
than close-enough approximation, knowing that the details could be sorted out through litiga-
tion and that the court would defer to the agency's decisions under the guise of deferring to
interpretations. If agencies are permitted to leave these details to case-by-case determina-
67 Id. at 617.
68 Anthony, supra note 7, at 12.
69 See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("It is perfectly understandable, of course, for an agency to issue vague regulations, because to do so
maximizes agency power and allows the agency greater latitude to make law through adjudication rather
than through the more cumbersome rulemaking process."); cf Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257
(2006) (finding Auer deference inappropriate because "[a]n agency does not acquire special authority to
interpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise and experience to formulate a regulation, it
has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language"). See also Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012) (refusing to afford Auer deference based on lack of notice); Talk Am.,
Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[Although] Ihave in
the past uncritically accepted [the Auer] rule, I have become increasingly doubtful of its validity.").
70 See infra notes 71-73.
71 Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
72 Id.
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tions, agencies could create de facto new regulation through litigation without ever providing
adequate notice of those expectations prior to the litigation.73
Given these concerns, one might reasonably ask how the Auer doctrine has
come to be. Scholarly work before Decker, however, surprisingly lacked
awareness of the history of the doctrine.74 Although scholars generally
acknowledged that Seminole Rock was a price control case during World
War II, no scholarship examined how and why the case transformed from
this unique context into an "axiom of judicial review" over time."
Recognizing this gap, the authors of this Article began a project to
more deeply examine the roots of Seminole Rock. In another article, the
authors examined the background of Seminole Rock and the subsequent
history of lower courts applying the case as it transformed into today's Auer
doctrine." In short, that work revealed that the original context and under-
standing of Seminole Rock has been lost, and no court has ever explained
why.77
This Article takes a slightly different approach to the evolution of
Seminole Rock. In order to understand the transformation of Seminole Rock,
this Article applies the basic facts of Decker to a series of hypothetical
opinions from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit at different
periods in the evolution of the Auer doctrine. As the court in closest prox-
imity to federal agencies and with the highest percentage of administrative
law cases, the D.C. Circuit is viewed as the expert and trendsetter in admin-
istrative law." Consistent with this, the D.C. Circuit hears "more cases in-
volving judicial review of agency action than any other circuit."" As a re-
sult, the D.C. Circuit was a natural choice for this exercise because it of-
fered more access to relevant precedent against which to contextualize the
facts of the hypothetical case.
7 Brief for Law Professors as Amici Curiae on the Propriety of Administrative Deference in
Support of Respondent at 35, Decker, 133 S. Ct. 1326 (Nos. 11-338 & 11-347) [hereinafter Brief for
Law Professors]; see also Kevin 0. Leske, Between Seminole Rock anda Hard Place: A New Approach
to Agency Deference, 46 CONN. L. REv. 227, 230 (2013) (citing Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent:
The Place for a "Legislative History" of Agency Rules, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 290 (2000); Kristin E.
Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modem Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
1235, 1309 (2007)); Robert A. Anthony & Michael Asimow, The Court's Deferences-A Foolish In-
consistency, 26 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, no. 1, Fall 2000, at 10, 10-11.
74 Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 9, at 1.
75 Id at 5 (quoting Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Lloyd Wood Constr. Co., 446 F.2d 261, 265 (5th
Cir. 1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
76 Id. at 1.
77 Id.
78 Given its location, one would expect that the members of the D.C. Circuit would be more "in
the know" regarding current agency business than a court operating far from the nation's capital. See
FUNK ET AL., supra note 165, at 66; Pierce, supra note 54, at 90.
79 Pierce, supra note 54, at 90.
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As an illustrative exercise, this Article takes a certain amount of crea-
tive license in the hypothetical response of the D.C. Circuit to the facts of
Decker during the stages in the evolution of Seminole Rock. Nevertheless,
these hypothetical opinions capture a central concern: a transformation
without explanation-as occurred with Seminole Rock-results in some-
thing that is itself unexplainable: the Auer doctrine. Accordingly, the inex-
plicable evolution of Seminole Rock lies at the heart of current judicial and
scholarly concerns about the Auer doctrine.
II. FACTS OF THE DECKER CASE FOR THE HYPOTHETICAL OPINIONS THAT
FOLLOW
Before proceeding to the hypothetical opinions that illustrate the evo-
lution of Seminole Rock, this Part provides the factual background for a
single recent case-Decker v. NEDC-that serves as the basis for the opin-
ions that follow.
Decker concerned the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") in-
terpretation of "industrial activity" in its water pollution regulations not to
include commercial logging." In order to control water pollution, the Clean
Water Act requires a permit for any discharge into navigable waters from a
"point source."" Permits do not eliminate discharges.8 2 Instead, they set
national limits on how much polluted water may be added to a larger body
of water such as a river or lake."
In Decker, an environmental group, the NEDC, filed suit alleging that
private logging corporations harvesting timber in the Tillamook State For-
est violated the Clean Water Act by discharging storm water into navigable
waters without a permit.84 The NEDC's central concern stemmed from a
man-made water collection and drainage network along logging roads used
to collect storm water generated by logging operations." The storm water
contained "large amounts of sediment, in the form of dirt and crushed grav-
el from the [logging] roads."" The water in the culverts, ditches, and pipes
of the system eventually flows into rivers and their tributary streams."
The Clean Water Act defines the term "point source" as "any discerni-
ble, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any
pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, [or] conduit ... from which pollutants are or
80 Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1331 (2013).
81 See 33 U.S.C. §§1311(a), 1342(a) (2012).
82 Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1331.
83 Id.
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may be discharged."" In addition to other discharges, the Clean Water Act
requires a specific permit for storm water discharges "associated with in-
dustrial activity."" The NEDC contended that, based on the plain language
of the statute, the loggers' storm water networks resulted in discharges from
a point source that required permits.90
The EPA, however, argued that certain storm water discharges are ex-
empt from permit requirements under the statute." Before Decker, the EPA
enacted a rule defining "storm water discharge associated with industrial
activity" as
the discharge from any conveyance that is used for collecting and conveying storm water and
that is directly related to manufacturing, processing or raw materials storage areas at an in-
dustrial plant. The term does not include discharges from facilities or activities excluded
from the NPDES program under this part 122. For the categories of industries identified in
this section, the term includes, but is not limited to, storm water discharges from . . . immedi-
ate access roads... used or traveled by carriers of raw materials, manufactured products,
waste material, or by-products used or created by the facility . . . .92
To identify the categories of "facilities" engaged in "industrial activity," the
EPA's rule incorporates by reference Standard Industrial Classification
("SIC") codes.93 SIC code 24 identifies "logging" as industrial activity.94
Despite this language-which appears to make logging an industrial
activity and therefore subject to storm water permitting requirements-the
EPA submitted an amicus brief in the litigation." In that brief, the EPA
interpreted logging not to constitute "industrial activity."96 Therefore, the
EPA argued, precipitation-driven runoff from logging roads did not require
a permit, even if storm water flowed through a ditch, channel, or culvert
and into navigable waters of the United States."
This interpretation, the EPA explained, is more consistent with a
common understanding of "industrial activity."" As for why the regulation
referenced the SIC code, the EPA contended that it only meant to signal its
intent to regulate traditional industrial sources.99 These sources include the
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012).
Id. § 1342(p)(2)(B).
90 Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1336.
91 Id. at 1336-37.
92 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) (2013).
93 Id. § 122.26(b)(14)(ii).
94 Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1332.
95 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Decker, 133 S. Ct. 1326 (Nos. 11-338 & 11-347.
96 Id. at 11.
97 Id. at 2.
98 Id. at 3 ("The CWA does not define the term 'storm water discharge associated with industrial
activity."').
99 Id. at 13 (explaining that "EPA primarily referenced this SIC code to regulate traditional indus-
trial sources such as sawmills" (quoting another source) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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four subcategories of silvicultural activities that the EPA had already de-
fined as point sources in its rule: rock crushing, gravel washing, log sorting,
and log storage.'" Because those operations were more closely associated
with traditional industrial activities than logging, the EPA contended that its
interpretation exempting logging from permitting was reasonable and there-
fore entitled to deference.''
III. ILLUSTRATIVE D.C. CIRCUIT OPINIONS
This Part imagines the response of the D.C. Circuit to the EPA's re-
quest for deference on the facts of Decker at various times in the develop-
ment of the Seminole Rock doctrine. Although the EPA did not exist until
1970, the Article assumes that the EPA existed as of the first hypothetical
opinion in 1947. In addition, although one issue before the Court in Decker
was whether the regulations contradicted the statute,'02 this Article assumes
that no such contradiction exists. Finally, the citations in the opinions are
not necessarily what one would expect at the time, but rather these citations
intend to illustrate the contemporaneous concepts and/or examples used in
writing the opinion.o3 As with any exercise like this, the hypothetical opin-
ions cannot reflect the totality of the historical context. Rather, the hypo-
thetical opinions intend to give a snapshot of Decker's most likely outcome
at various points of Seminole Rock's interpretation. The opinions below
start shortly after the Seminole Rock decision in 1945 and continue through
five different periods, culminating in the modem interpretation of the Semi-
nole Rock doctrine, which arose in the 1970s and was affirmed in 1982.
A. 1947-Skepticism in the Wake of Seminole Rock
The EPA has asked for deference under Seminole Rock to its interpre-
tation of its regulation for storm water discharge permitting. We are sur-
prised by this request. First, very few agencies engage in rulemaking and
even fewer agencies have asked this court for deference to their interpreta-
tions of their regulations.'" Although we can surely entertain a novel re-
quest like this, we are more troubled by the precedent that the EPA relies on
100 Id.
101 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 95, at 13-14.
102 See Brief for Law Professors, supra note 73, at 12-15.
103 For example, some of these citations draw upon modem scholarship and commentary regarding
past events and interpretations.
104 See Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking's Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the
1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1139, 1140 (2001) ("Although rulemaking had been around for
decades, it was only at the end of the 1960s that agencies turned to it as the primary staple of administra-
tive action.").
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to make its request. It is unclear what weight, if any, ought to be accorded
to Seminole Rock after the Supreme Court's decision in M Kraus & Bros.,
Inc. v. United States.'o In Kraus, unlike Seminole Rock, the Court did not
follow the interpretation offered by the Office of Price Administration
("OPA") of its own regulations."o6 This leads us to conclude that "the lan-
guage of an individual case about weight to be given administrative inter-
pretations must be read in the light of the continuing wide margin for judi-
cial discretion."o' It therefore appears to us that Seminole Rock should be
limited to its facts.
Even if we assume that Seminole Rock has not been called into ques-
tion by Kraus, the interpretation at issue here fails to satisfy the require-
ments of Seminole Rock. First, Seminole Rock involved the OPA, which
was operating in wartime circumstances to stabilize the country's econo-
my."0 s This case, however, neither involves the OPA nor implicates any
clear financial issues, let alone the stability of the nation's economy. In
Seminole Rock, the OPA's interpretation was necessary to provide certainty
and reliability. As a result, the deference found in Seminole Rock has never
been extended to any agency other than the OPA. We are hesitant to extend
it here to the EPA, an agency created to regulate environmental health and
safety.
Second, the Court in Seminole Rock began its analysis with its own in-
terpretation of the regulations at issue."' When we turn to the language of
the statute and the regulations at issue here, we are concerned that the inter-
pretation offered by the EPA is inconsistent with the governing statute and
the text of the regulations."0
105 327 U.S. 614 (1946).
106 Id. at 625.
107 Kenneth Culp Davis, Scope of Review of Federal Administrative Action, 50 COLUM. L. REV.
559, 598 (1950).
108 See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413 (1945) (stating the Court "grant-
ed certiorari because of the importance of the problem in the administration of the emergency price
control and stabilization laws"); Donald H. Wallace & Philip H. Coombs, Economic Considerations in
Establishing Maximum Prices in Wartime, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 104 (1942) ("[S]elective
price control becomes inadequate as a means of achieving the objectives of war price control when
inflationary pressures become generalized. By the end of the first quarter of 1942 it was apparent that
the American economy was threatened by a mounting inflationary tidal wave. The only effective meas-
ure against such a deluge is a broad price freeze.").
109 See Michael P. Healy, The Past, Present and Future of Auer Deference: Mead, Form and
Function in Judicial Review ofAgency Interpretations of Regulations, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 633, 637, 639
(2014) (describing the analysis in Seminole Rock as follows: "The strong rule of deference described by
the Court [in Seminole Rock] is, however, undercut by the analysis that follows the Court's statement of
the rule... . Only after this extensive analysis of the regulatory text does the Court turn its attention to
the agency's own interpretation of the regulation.").
110 The analysis that follows is based largely on Justice Scalia's opinion in Decker. Decker v. Nw.
Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1343 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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The Clean Water Act defines the term "point source" as "any discerni-
ble, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any
pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, [or] conduit ... from which pollutants are or
may be discharged."'"' It also requires permits for all storm water discharg-
es "associated with industrial activity."ll 2 The regulation describing what is
"associated with industrial activity" sets out eleven "categories of indus-
tries.""' As to those industries, discharges are "associated with industrial
activity" if they come from sites used for "transportation" of "any raw ma-
terial."I.14
The forest roads at issue here are used to transport raw material (logs);
the only question is whether logging is a "categor[y] of industr[y]" enumer-
ated in the regulation's definition."' It is. The second listing of industries in
the EPA's regulation enumerates activities in "Standard Industrial Classifi-
cations 24 (except 2434)" as qualifying industries."' Opening one's hymnal
to Standard Industrial Classification 24 ("Lumber and Wood Products, Ex-
cept Furniture"), one finds that the first industry group listed is "Log-
ging"-defined as "[e]stablishments primarily engaged in cutting tim-
ber.""' If that were not clear enough, the SIC lists an illustrative product of
this industry: "Logs.""' In short, our reading of the statute and the regula-
tions in this case is at odds with the conclusion reached by the EPA. Even
under Seminole Rock, we cannot give effect to a proffered interpretation
that contravenes the plain text."'
Finally, the EPA's interpretation lacks the key procedural features of
the interpretation in Seminole Rock. The OPA interpretation at issue in that
case was published concurrently with the regulation,'20 was made widely
available,2 ' and was directly on point.'22 Here, the EPA has offered an ex-
planation in an amicus brief in this litigation.'2 3 It has never been published
or made widely available. This falls far short of what we would expect
111 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012).
112 Id. § 1342(p)(2)(B).
113 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) (2013).
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14)(ii) (2009).
117 SIC Manual, Occupational Safety & Health Administration, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, https://
www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic-manual.display?id=17&tab=group (last visited Feb. 20, 2015) [hereinafter
SIC Manual].
118 This passage is based largely on the language found in Justice Scalia's opinion in Decker.
Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1343 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
119 Id.
120 Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 417 (1945).
121 Frank C. Newman, How Courts Interpret Regulations, 35 CAL. L. REV. 509, 531 (1947).
122 OFFICE OF PRICE ADMIN., BULL. NO. 1, THE GENERAL MAXIMUM PRICE REGULATION 3 (1942).
123 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 95, at 13-14.
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when affording weight to an agency interpretation.24 1In short, we disagree
with the interpretation offered by the EPA and conclude that permits are
required for the storm water discharges at issue in this case.
B. 1952-Great Restraint Continues with Only Small Changes
The EPA has asked for deference to its interpretation of its regulation
under Seminole Rock. We decline this request for three reasons. First, alt-
hough we have extended the reach of Seminole Rock to agencies other than
the OPA, we have largely done so when the agency relying on Seminole
Rock is one of the OPA's successor agencies, uch as the Office of the
Housing Expediter, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of
Commerce (Division of Liquidation), and the Reconstruction Finance
Company.'25 Moreover, the principles embraced in Seminole Rock were
designed to create reliability in an unstable period of war. They are not
principles of general applicability. We have therefore generally limited the
application of Seminole Rock to cases involving price controls, labor, and
wartime loyalty;'26 this case does not raise any of those issues.
Second, we are troubled by the lack of notice given by the EPA for
this interpretation. The interpretation was not published in the Federal Reg-
ister, nor does it appear in any other public forum.'27 Instead, the EPA pro-
vided the interpretation in a brief after this litigation began. As a matter of
fundamental fairness, we are particularly wary of these kinds of interpreta-
tions.
Finally, because the interpretation appears for the first time in a brief
in litigation, it does not demonstrate characteristics that might give it more
weight under Skidmore such as "the thoroughness evident in its considera-
tion, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pro-
nouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lack-
124 Fleming v. Van Der Loo, 160 F.2d 906, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (refusing deference to un-
published, private letter to the litigant after the onset of the controversy).
125 See, e.g., Danz v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 193 F.2d 1010, 1016 (Emer. Ct. App. 1952) (ap-
plying Seminole Rock to the Reconstruction Finance Company); Woods v. Petchell, 175 F.2d 202, 206
(8th Cir. 1949) (applying Seminole Rock to the Office of the Housing Expediter); L. Gillarde Co. v.
Joseph Martinelli & Co., 169 F.2d 60, 61 (1st Cir. 1948) (applying Seminole Rock to the Department of
Agriculture); Fleet-Wing Corp. v. Clark, 166 F.2d 145, 147 (Emer. Ct. App. 1948) (applying Seminole
Rock to the Department of Commerce, Division of Liquidation). For a list of OPA's successor agencies,
see Records of the Office of the Price Administration, NAT'L ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/
research/guide-fed-records/groups/1 88.html#1 88.1 (last visited Jan. 2, 2015).
126 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
127 See Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (refusing to defer to inter-
pretive letter to litigant in a case involving the Internal Revenue Service); Bailey v. Richardson, 182
F.2d 46, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (deferring to a Presidential Memorandum, which was published in the
Federal Register, in case involving the Civil Service Commission's Loyalty Review Board).
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ing power to control."'2 8 Without such a showing, we will not give defer-
ence to the EPA's interpretation. Under our own reading of the statute and
its regulation, we conclude that permits are required for the storm water
discharges at issue here.
C. 1964-Transformation to a Doctrine ofJudicial Restraint with Some
Remaining Limits
The EPA has asked for deference under Seminole Rock to its interpre-
tation of its regulation for storm water discharge permitting. We are unsur-
prised by this request because many agencies engaged in rulemaking have
sought Seminole Rock deference for interpretations of their rules.'29 Our
cases have signaled that we will entertain whether Seminole Rock deference
is appropriate regardless of the agency requesting the deference.'
As we have said in several cases, an agency is subject to our review
only if it has acted arbitrarily or unreasonably or if the interpretation offered
is erroneous as a matter of law.'3 ' As Seminole Rock requires, if the agen-
cy's interpretation is reasonable, we cannot disturb it.'32
The respondent NEDC claims, however, that regardless of whether the
EPA's interpretation is reasonable, this court should not afford deference to
an interpretation that is not found in the Federal Register or at least pub-
lished and widely available like the interpretation in Seminole Rock. We
think a requirement to publish in the Federal Register "would make the
administrative process inflexible and incapable of dealing with many of the
specialized problems which arise."' We agree, though, that some notice is
required.
Accordingly, to satisfy notice, we must examine whether the EPA has
consistently applied the interpretation in practice and in previous adjudica-
128 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). In this time period, it was common for
courts to cite both Seminole Rock and Skidmore as if they were two sides of the same coin. See Gibson
Wine, 194 F.2d at 332.
129 See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The
Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 546-70 (2002) (describing advocacy for the increased use
of rulemaking in the late 1950s and 1960s and noting the large uptick in the use of rulemaking resulting
from those advocacy efforts by the 1960s).
130 See Wright v. Paine, 289 F.2d 766, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (applying Seminole Rock to interpreta-
tions of the Department of the Interior); Outland v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 284 F.2d 224, 228-29 (D.C.
Cir. 1960) (applying Seminole Rock to interpretations of the Civil Aeronautics Board).
131 See Morgan v. Udall, 306 F.2d 799, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
132 See Sw. Petroleum Corp. v. Udall, 325 F.2d 633, 635 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
1 Boesche v. Udall, 303 F.2d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194, 202 (1947)) (internal quotation marks omitted), af'd, 373 U.S. 472 (1963).
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tions.'34 In this case, the EPA's interpretation first appeared in this litiga-
tion. It is therefore not longstanding and cannot qualify for deference.
Because we are not obligated to defer, we adopt the more natural read-
ing of the regulations. The regulation explains that discharges are "associat-
ed with industrial activity" and therefore require permits if they come from
sites used for "transportation" of "any raw material."' The forest roads in
this case are used to transport raw material-logs-and logging is a
"categor[y] of industr[y]" enumerated in the definition because SIC 24
("Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture"), No. 2411 lists "Log-
ging" as industrial activity.' We therefore conclude that permits are re-
quired for the challenged storm water discharges at issue in this case.
D. 1972-Full Transformation
The EPA has asked for deference under Seminole Rock to its interpre-
tation of its regulation for storm water discharge permitting. There is no
question that the EPA is authorized to promulgate the regulations at issue.
We are therefore required to give its interpretation of those regulations
great weight: "[T]he ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation,
which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or in-
consistent with the regulation."' Because no plain error or inconsistency is
obvious, we defer to the EPA's interpretation.
Respondent NEDC complains that the interpretation at issue in this
case only appeared in the litigation itself. Our cases make clear, however,
that deference attaches to interpretations, regardless of where or how they
appear.' The EPA cannot possibly anticipate each and every possible vari-
ation of facts under its rules. As a result, it often must interpret regulations
in the face of specific facts when they arise, as the EPA did here.
134 Id. at 206 (observing that "the Secretary 'has always considered lands covered only by an
outstanding application to be available for leasing' (quoting Natalie Z. Shell, 62 Interior Dec. 417, 419
(1955))); see Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Rules-Interpretative, Legislative, and Retroactive,
57 YALE L.J. 919, 921 (1948) (remarking that "[m]ore than a century ago the Supreme Court observed
that 'usages have been established in every department of the government, which have become a kind of
common law, and regulate the rights and duties of those who act within their respective limits"' (quoting
United States v. Macdaniel, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 1, 15 (1833))).
135 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) (2013).
136 Id.; SIC Manual, supra note 117.
137 Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); see also Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Fed. Power Comm'n, 469 F.2d 130, 138 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("Since this interpretation of the regula-
tion is not arbitrary or unreasonable, we accept it.").
138 See Cedar Rapids Television Co. v. FCC, 387 F.2d 228, 230 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (applying Semi-
nole Rock to an interpretation provided for the first time in the litigation); Robertson v. Udall, 349 F.2d
195, 197-98 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (rejecting a requirement that the interpretation be longstanding or neces-
sarily consistent with prior practices).
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Because we conclude that the EPA's interpretation is entitled to "con-
trolling weight,"1 39 we find that no permits are required for the discharges at
issue in this case.
E. 1982-Transformation Reaffirmed (with Some Wavering Along the
Way)
The EPA has asked for deference under Seminole Rock to its interpre-
tation of its regulation for storm water discharge permitting. Under Semi-
nole Rock, "[a]n agency's construction of its own regulation demands def-
erence by the courts, and is not to be upset unless inconsistent with the reg-
ulation or unreasonable."'40 Although we have signaled some limits to this
rule, such as whether the issue involves agency expertise and whether the
agency consistently applied the interpretation for a significant period of
time,14 ' the way in which we consider these factors varies from case to case.
"It is a basic tenet of administrative law that administrative agencies
are entitled to wide latitude in interpreting their own regulations."'42 In this
case, we believe the exclusion of logging roads from permitting reflects the
EPA's experience and expertise in this arena. We "need not find that the
agency's construction is the only possible one, or even the one that [we]
would have adopted in the first instance." 4 3
Although several alternative interpretations are possible, our task here
is narrow: is the EPA's interpretation "reasonable and consistent with the
regulation"?'" We find that it is. The EPA relies on the common-sense un-
derstanding of the phrase "industrial activity" in the regulation to conclude
that it does not include logging. Moreover, "even if logging . .. is a type of
economic activity within the regulation's scope, a reasonable interpretation
of the regulation could still require the discharges to be related in a direct
way to operations 'at an industrial plant"' to trigger permitting requirements
under the Clean Water Act.145
We therefore defer to the EPA's interpretation and conclude that no
permit is required in this case.
139 Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1340 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414) (internal quotation marks omitted).
140 Koch Indus., Inc. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1158, 1163-64 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
141 See S. Mut. Help Ass'n v. Califano, 574 F.2d 518, 526-27 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (concluding that
deference need not be afforded after articulating and analyzing the new factors).
142 See Ashland Exploration, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 631 F.2d 1018, 1021-22
(D.C. Cir. 1980) ("It is a basic tenet of administrative law that administrative agencies are entitled to
wide latitude in interpreting their own regulations.").
143 See Belco Petroleum Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 589 F.2d 680, 685 (D.C. Cir.
1978).
144 Id.
145 Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1337 (2013).
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IV. OBSERVATIONS
As this exercise has demonstrated, the history of Seminole Rock is a
complicated one. This Part offers a few observations.
First, and perhaps most obvious, the hypothetical opinions illustrate
that the constrained roots of the Seminole Rock doctrine do not explain its
present expansive application. For this reason alone, the Supreme Court
ought to reconsider Seminole Rock/Auer deference to reconcile the doctrine
with its history.
Second, the most dramatic transformation of Seminole Rock-found in
the sequence of example opinions from 1964 to 198214 6-occurred during a
period when rulemaking was coming into fashion.'47 In the late 1940s and
1950s, adjudication (i.e., developing a rule to a specific factual setting) was
the predominant way in which administrative rules were made.148 The adju-
dicative setting provided the origin of Seminole Rock and remains the typi-
cal setting for Auer deference.'49
By the late 1950s, many began to question the wisdom of making rules
through fact-specific proceedings.' The advocates argued, "Making policy
through adjudication can lead to inconsistent outcomes and frustrates ex-
pectations when policy changes retroactively. Making policy through rule-
making is much more likely to result in standards that apply prospectively,
providing clear notice of the law's requirements to all concerned.""'5 As
more scholars and judges joined in support of rulemaking, agencies en-
gaged in more and more of it.152 Rulemaking was so popular that by 1978,
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis proclaimed that "administrative rulemaking
is 'one of the greatest inventions of modern government."""'
In the excitement for rulemaking, one would expect both an increase
in rules and in requests from agencies for judicial deference to their inter-
pretations of these new rules. When faced with agencies' requests for Semi-
nole Rock deference, no opinions or even journal articles explained the
metes and bounds of Seminole Rock in the manner of the hypothetical opin-
ions provided in Part II. Given the dearth of supporting case law and schol-
arly commentary, the D.C. Circuit began to accept the arguments for expan-
146 See supra Part III.C-E.
147 Merrill & Watts, supra note 129, at 526.
148 id
149 Manning, supra note 6, at 639.
10 Merrill & Watts, supra note 129, at 546.
151 Id (footnote omitted).
152 Id. at 548-49.
153 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 448 (2d ed. 1978) (quoting
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.15 (Supp. 1970)).
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sive deference in the 1970sl5 4 without, it appears, fully appreciating the
change it was making in the law.
Given its unique and prolific role in administrative law, the D.C. Cir-
cuit was, and is, particularly influential on other courts.' Its embrace of
new administrative law principles has been and remains important in the
development of administrative law." 6 The court's location and repeat rela-
tionship with many government lawyers might be part of the answer. The
judges' everyday exposure to local lawyers both in-and one would as-
sume-out of court might persuade the court to adopt an expanded interpre-
tation of Seminole Rock over time.
Third, and finally, the full expansion of Seminole Rock has not come
without periods of concern. Courts signaled this discomfort by occasionally
articulating the Seminole Rock test in combination with Skidmore deference
or in Skidmore-like terms.' Two periods of D.C. Circuit opinions demon-
strate this trend. First, in the 1950s, the D.C. Circuit mixed the two opin-
ions, largely as a mechanism to restrain the application of Seminole Rock.'15
Later, in the mid-1970s, a few notable opinions conditioned Seminole Rock
deference on terms more consistent with Skidmore's approach.' After the
1970s, the D.C. Circuit and Supreme Court backed away from Skidmore-
like factors, and by the early 1980s, the Seminole Rock test again omitted
Skidmore-like factors.6 o
154 See, e.g., Belco Petroleum Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 589 F.2d 680, 685-86
(D.C. Cir. 1978) ("When construction of an agency regulation is in issue, courts owe great deference to
the interpretation adopted by the agency and will uphold that interpretation if it is reasonable and con-
sistent with the regulation. The court need not find that the agency's construction is the only possible
one, or even the one that the court would have adopted in the first instance."); Koch Indus., Inc. v. Fed.
Power Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1158, 1163-64 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("An agency's construction of its own regula-
tion demands deference by the courts, and is not to be upset unless inconsistent with the regulation or
unreasonable.").
155 See FIJNKET AL.,supra note 15, at 66.
156 Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978
SUP. CT. REv. 345, 348-49, 359.
157 See British Caledonian Airways, Ltd. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 584 F.2d 982, 995 (D.C. Cir.
1978).
158 See Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (citing to both Skidmore
and Seminole Rock after remarking that an unpublished interpretation would be given less weight be-
cause it is not backed by certain procedural safeguards).
159 See, e.g., British Caledonian Airways, 584 F.2d at 994-96 ("Relying on the factors set forth in
Skidmore v. Swyi & Co., we feel that the Board's interpretation is, in light of the statute and the regula-
tions, persuasive and in conformity with law." (citation omitted)); S. Mut. Help Ass'n v. Califano, 574
F.2d 518, 526-27 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (citing Skidmore-like factors of expertise and consistency as require-
ments for applying Seminole Rock deference).
160 Professor Kevin Leske has argued that "[a] significant change to the Seminole Rock standard
emerged in 1988 .... [The] analysis required consideration of the original intent of the agency when it
promulgated the regulation at issue." Leske, supra note 73, at 253-54. In support of this change, Leske
cites Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988), and Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S.
504, 512-13 (1994). Id. By 1997, however, the Court no longer mentioned the original intent of the
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In recent cases in which several members of the Supreme Court openly
questioned Seminole Rock/Auer deference, the Court has returned to a more
Skidmore-like test. In Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,' the
Court made clear that it would not afford Auer deference in several circum-
stances, all of which reflect Skidmore's requirements of consistency, thor-
oughness, and validity.'62 Consistent with scholarly arguments,'63 this phe-
nomenon suggests growing judicial support for independent checks on
agency interpretations of their own regulations.
CONCLUSION
Deference doctrines are tricky. They have confounded, confused, and
inspired much criticism. This is particularly true for Seminole Rock/Auer
deference the more one understands about its history and development. In
short, the Seminole Rock/Auer doctrine has expanded from its constrained
origins into an "axiom of judicial review,"'" but no one has ever explained
why. Alongside the already-voiced policy and separation of powers con-
cerns,'65 this powerful evidence should prompt the Court to reconsider the
basis for the current application of deference for an agency's interpretation
of its own regulations.
agency as part of the Seminole Rock inquiry. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Leske,
supra note 73, at 257.
Arguably, consideration of original intent is more consistent with Seminole Rock's origins,
which relied on a published interpretation that was issued simultaneously with the regulation. See
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 417 (1945). It is unclear, however, if the Court
decided to consider the agency's original intent during this brief period to better align with Seminole
Rock's original context. Professor Manning has suggested that the intent of an agency when the regula-
tion is promulgated-and, more specifically, the agency's statement of basis and purpose-ought o be
one of the factors considered if Skidmore were to replace Seminole Rock. Manning, supra note 6, at 689-
90.
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